09 December 2010

On Bullshit

Since I was the one who insisted on reawakening this comatose blog, I'll be the one to break the ice, starting with a short, easy, and entertaining classic: Harry G. Frankfurt's On Bullshit.

If writing stuff like this is his job, then I want to be a philosophy professor at Princeton, too. This philosophical essay on bullshit traces the origins of the word, and words related to it, in the Oxford English Dictionary. It includes an amusing anecdote in which Wittgenstein ostensibly calls out a Cambridge college friend on her bullshit. He also referenced Augustine's essay, "Lying," which outlines eight different types of lies, none of which qualify as bullshit. (Frankfurt quotes Augustine to strengthen a distinction between lies and bullshit, but I mention it here because Augustine's essay sounds interesting in itself.)

According to Frankfurt, "the essence of bullshit" is a "lack of connection to a concern with truth" and an "indifference to how things really are" (33-34). The most memorable and important point he makes is his distinction between lies and bullshit: "The bullshitter...does not reject the authority of the truth, as the liar does, and oppose himself to it. He pays no attention to it at all. By virtue of this, bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are" (61). [emphasis mine] Another defining element of bullshit is the purpose for which it is used-- to get away with something, or to convey a certain impression of oneself (23, 18).

Frankfurt leaves us to consider "the problem of understanding why our attitude toward bullshit is generally more benign than our attitude toward lying" (50).

Since bullshit is nearly as ubiquitous as the air we breathe, it would be difficult to take much offense to it. When exposed, a lie arouses a sense of betrayal and anger in those who were misled, whereas bullshit is just somewhat irritating. I think it's possible that all the bullshitters in the political realm exploit this to their advantage, scapegoating the liars so they can continue getting away with their bullshit.

Any thoughts on Frankfurt's question?

6 comments:

  1. Hmm...well, even without giving this due thought, I seem to have developed an opinion. Certainly, if we use Frankfurt's definition of bullshit, "indifference to how things really are," one could readily agree with his assertion that "bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are." However, I must contend with his definition. If bullshitting is used to 'convey a certain impression of oneself,' and I believe it is, then wouldn't that reveal one's concern about the way things are? I only bullshit because I realize that I'm in competition with others, right?
    Of course, we all know people who BS pathologically - but that is a discussion for another day...

    Good job, Crystal!

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  2. Hi, Crystal! It's good to be back.

    I'm a little bit nervous about expounding on this topic, as I have not read the book or thought carefully about its subject, rendering my comments, potentially.... bullshit.

    Would you say, going by Frankfurt's definition, that hatred:apathy :: lying:bullshit? (Now there's an analogy you won't find on the GRE - more's the pity.)

    I think it's a good point that disregard of the truth is more dangerous than an outright lie. But human perception is limited, and we tend to focus on what is easiest to see. People don't get as worked up about failing to achieve a potential gain than they do about experiencing an actual loss of the same magnitude. (It's a behavioral quirk in which some economists have taken an interest.) I would guess that the damage done by disregard of the truth is more subtle than that done by actively lying. That might explain our weaker response to it.

    Talking about lying puts me in mind of Mark Twain. He wrote on a number of occasions about the virtues of lying; here is a sample: http://www.online-literature.com/wilde/1320/. I have a hunch that Twain was pro-lying and anti-bullshit.

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  3. Katie, I just read your comment. It hadn't occurred to me before, but I think you're right - a bullshitter's "indifference to how things really are" can only extend so far. Maybe the definition needs a qualifier: "indifference to how things really are, except as that appears to directly benefit or harm oneself at the moment." So that others' beliefs may matter, but whether those beliefs correspond to reality may not. Good catch!

    (Ah, and if the new definition is accurate, then it indicates more clearly the source of the behavior: self-centeredness, coupled with short-sightedness.)

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  4. Rachel - I shared your hesitation about responding to the post! For the exact same reason. :)

    I like your new definition, with the qualifier. I think you are right, one of the foundational constituents of bullshit is short-sightedness. Therefore, any accurate or complete definition must include that component.

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  5. Yes, Rachel, bullshit is apathetic to truth, and its main purpose of benefitting the bullshitter is well documented in Frankfurt's essay. I guess I just didn't emphasize or include that part.

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  6. Thanks, Crystal. I see you do explain that in your review (which is very well-crafted, by the way). You say that "the purpose for which it is used" is a defining element of B.S. Probably Frankfurt omitted that part in the definition you quoted from pp 33-34 because he had a whole essay in which to clarify his meaning.

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